Boeing insists NASA criticism will reinforce efforts on Starliner

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Following NASA Administrator Jared Isaacman’s stark assessment of the Boeing CST-100 Starliner program’s troubled history—pinning the blame not just on technical flaws but on systemic failures in decision-making and leadership that he warned could erode the agency’s culture of safety in human spaceflight—Boeing reacted by saying the report will reinforce ongoing efforts to improve its crew vehicle.

The assessment, released alongside an independent investigative report and a briefing to Congress, retroactively classifies the 2024 Crewed Flight Test (CFT) as a Type A mishap—NASA’s highest severity level for incidents posing grave risks to crew and mission objectives.

“Within the next week, Congress will be briefed by the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP), and NASA’s independent investigative report on the Starliner Crewed Flight Test will be released publicly,” Isaacman wrote in the letter addressed to the NASA team, and then released to the media and the public domain as part of the new leader’s drive to improve transparency.

The ASAP is a powerful panel that has been deeply embedded in oversight over all elements of NASA crewed vehicles, including during the Space Shuttle era.

“Even with our best efforts and programs, like CCP (Commercial Crew Program), that have seen great success, mistakes will occur,” he noted. “What defines us is whether we learn from them, improve because of them, and strengthen confidence across this workforce and the nation we serve. That requires transparency and accountability, neither of which can be selectively applied.”

The administrator’s critique goes beyond hardware issues, highlighting “design and engineering deficiencies that must be corrected” in Starliner, but underscoring that “the most troubling failure revealed by this investigation is not hardware. It is decision-making and leadership that, if left unchecked, could create a culture incompatible with human spaceflight.”

A Troubled Program History:

The overview provided a detailed timeline of the Starliner program’s setbacks, tracing issues back to its inception under the Commercial Crew Program in 2010.

The program aimed to establish “dissimilar crew access to low Earth orbit” following the retirement of the Space Shuttle, ensuring no future gaps in American human spaceflight capability—a “national imperative,” as Isaacman described it.

Ironically, it was that “dissimilar redundancy” that was the tagline used by the Dream Chaser program, a vehicle that lost out to Starliner (and Crew Dragon) during the CCtCAP award, a decision that was immediately protested by Sierra Nevada Corporation (SNC), now known as Sierra Space.

Crewed Dream Chaser – via SNC

Starliner’s first mission was the uncrewed Orbital Flight Test 1 (OFT-1) in December 2019. A mission elapsed time error prevented the guidance software from calculating orbit insertion burn timing, leading to excessive thruster firings, incorrect orbital insertion, major propellant consumption, and the failure of ten thrusters. The mission was deemed a “high-visibility close call.”

Orbital Flight Test 2 (OFT-2) followed in August 2021: During a launch countdown cycle test of the Service Module Propulsion System manifold isolation valves, 13 of the 24 oxidizer valves failed to open, stuck in the closed position, resulting in a launch scrub. The spacecraft and booster were rolled back, and the Service Module was replaced, delaying launch by many months.
OFT-2 finally launched in May 2022, which was largely nominal compared to prior attempts, but still saw three aft Service Module Reaction Control System (RCS) thrusters declared failed during flight.

In preparation for the crewed flight, Isaacman criticized the handling of previous investigations: “The OFT and OFT-2 investigations did not drive to, or take sufficient action on, the root causes of major anomalies. The investigations often stopped at the proximate (direct) cause, treated it with a fix, or accepted the issue as an unexplained anomaly.

“In some cases, the proximate-cause diagnosis itself was incorrect due to insufficient rigor in following the data to its logical conclusion.”

The Crewed Flight Test itself launched on June 5, 2024, after multiple delays and unexpected helium leaks, carrying astronauts Butch Wilmore and Suni Williams. During “rendezvous and proximity operations with the International Space Station (ISS), propulsion anomalies escalated into multiple thruster failures and a temporary loss of six-degree-of-freedom control.

“Controllers and crew performed with extraordinary professionalism,” Isaacman praised. “Flight rules were appropriately challenged, control was recovered, and docking was achieved.”

However, he issued a sobering reminder: “It is worth restating what should be obvious. At that moment, had different decisions been made, had thrusters not been recovered, or had docking been unsuccessful, the outcome of this mission could have been very different.”

The astronauts remained safely on the ISS, advocating for thorough data analysis, testing, and leadership involvement to ensure a safe return.

Ground teams from Boeing and NASA conducted evaluations, but ultimately, Starliner undocked autonomously in September 2024, suffered an unexpected Crew Module propulsion failure, and landed successfully—albeit without full fault tolerance in the crew module thrusters during reentry.
This highlighted the correct decision for Wilmore and Williams to wait to return via SpaceX’s Crew-9 in March 2025.

The Investigation’s Damning Findings:

The independent report, commissioned after initial internal reviews, revealed pervasive mistakes “from the program’s inception and continued throughout execution, including contract management, oversight posture, technical rigor, and leadership decision making.”

Isaacman acknowledged NASA’s role: “We built the spacecraft, and from the onset NASA approved variances and agreed to fly it. As development progressed, design compromises and inadequate hardware qualification extended beyond NASA’s complete understanding.”

He noted that variances are common in aerospace programs, but Starliner’s qualification deficiencies make it “less reliable for crew survival than other crewed vehicles.” Yet, he placed significant blame on the agency: “But at NASA, we managed the contract. We accepted the vehicle. We launched the crew. We made decisions from docking through post-mission actions. A considerable portion of the responsibility and accountability rests here.”

Technical investigations into proximate causes for thruster anomalies in the service and crew modules are ongoing, but organizational root causes were clearly identified.

NASA’s Oversight Approach: A “limited-touch acquisition and management posture” left the agency without sufficient systems knowledge or insight to certify a human-rated spacecraft. Insight versus oversight was inconsistently applied.

Boeing’s Design and Certification: The propulsion system was allowed to operate outside qualification limits, incompatible with crew safety margins.

Programmatic Pressures: The desire to maintain two dissimilar crew transportation systems (Boeing’s Starliner and SpaceX’s Dragon) influenced technical and operational risk discussions, sometimes prioritizing program viability over safety.

An envisioned future of Dragon, Starliner and Dream Chaser hanging out together on the ISS via Nathan Koga for L2 renders.

These issues manifested across mission phases, such as pre-launch, with over thirty scheduled launch attempts led to “cumulative schedule pressure and decision fatigue.”

Prior thruster risks from OFT missions were not fully understood, corrective actions were incomplete, and flight rationale was inadequate, the report added. Witness statements indicated a pervasive belief that “the management within the Commercial Crew Program could only succeed if Starliner launched.”

On-Orbit, disagreements over crew return options devolved into “unprofessional conduct” while the astronauts were still aboard the ISS. Advocacy for Starliner’s viability persisted, with “insufficient NASA leadership engagement to refocus teams on safety and mission outcomes.”

Post-Mission, despite the loss of control and costs exceeding Type A mishap thresholds “by a factor of one hundred,” no mishap was initially declared, influenced by concerns for the program’s reputation. The Commercial Crew Program initially investigated itself, which Isaacman deemed “inconsistent with NASA’s safety culture.”

To rectify this, NASA is now formally designating the event as a Type A mishap “to ensure lessons are fully captured for future missions.” Isaacman warned that “programmatic advocacy exceeded reasonable bounds and placed the mission, the crew, and America’s space program at risk in ways that were not fully understood at the time decisions were being contemplated.” He promised “leadership accountability” to prevent a “culture of mistrust.”

Path Forward and Commitment to Transparency:

Looking ahead, Isaacman affirmed NASA’s continued partnership with Boeing.

“NASA will continue working with Boeing, as we do with all partners undertaking flight tests. Sustained crew and cargo access to low Earth orbit will remain essential, and America benefits from competition and redundancy.”

However, he was unequivocal about future flights.

Starliner launching on Atlas V for CFT-1, via Sawyer Rosenstein for NSF.

“To be clear, NASA will not fly another crew on Starliner until technical causes are understood and corrected, the propulsion system is fully qualified, and appropriate investigation recommendations are implemented.”

Emphasizing transparency as a core strength, Isaacman, who has already been driving for improvements from within the Agency, stated: “Transparency is not a weakness. It is a strength.

“We will release the investigation in full, redacted only where legally required and as directed by our commercial partner.”

“Pretending unpleasant situations did not occur teaches the wrong lessons. Failure to learn invites failure again and suggests that, in human spaceflight, failure is an option. It is not.”

The full report includes 61 recommendations addressing technical fixes (e.g., resolving thruster failures due to two-phase oxidizer flow, Teflon poppet extrusion, helium leaks from material incompatibilities, and fault tolerance for deorbit burns), organizational reforms, and cultural shifts.

Isaacman closed with a call to action.

“America entrusts NASA with the hardest endeavors ever attempted. The world looks to us for the discoveries, achievements, and leadership only this agency can deliver, and that requires putting the mission and the crew first. We will achieve success through extreme ownership, immense competence, and decisive action.”

Boeing’s Response:

Boeing issued a statement to NSF in response to the report, with no pushback, but also no sign it would call it a day on the troubled program.

“We’re grateful to NASA for its thorough investigation and the opportunity to contribute to it. In the 18 months since our test flight, Boeing has made substantial progress on corrective actions for technical challenges we encountered and driven significant cultural changes across the team that directly align with the findings in the report.

“NASA’s report will reinforce our ongoing efforts to strengthen our work, and the work of all Commercial Crew Partners, in support of mission and crew safety, which is and must always be our highest priority. We’re working closely with NASA to ensure readiness for future Starliner missions and remain committed to NASA’s vision for two commercial crew providers.”

The statement reflected Boeing’s acknowledgment of the issues while highlighting proactive steps, though it stops short of addressing the leadership critiques leveled by Isaacman.

Broader Implications for U.S. Spaceflight:

This episode marks a pivotal moment for NASA’s Commercial Crew Program, which has relied on SpaceX’s Crew Dragon as the sole U.S. provider for ISS crew rotations since 2020.

The Starliner setbacks have delayed Boeing’s role as providing much-needed US domestic crew launch capability, raising questions about redundancy and the costs—both financial and reputational—of maintaining dual providers.

The report could also lead to broader reforms in NASA’s commercial partnerships, emphasizing stricter oversight and root-cause analysis.

Lead photo: Max Evans for NSF.

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